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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS—DOES
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ABSTRACT
The relationship between speech protected by the First Amendment and
the torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
is a complicated one. This is apparent in the recent Alaska Supreme Court
case of Carpenter v. Westwood One, which turned on an unusual set of
facts involving a national radio talk show host. The Alaska Supreme Court
drew a novel distinction between the kind of speech the First Amendment
protects from defamation and IIED actions, and other speech that is not
protected against such actions. The basis for the court’s distinction lies in the
difference between speech that makes assertions of fact and speech that does
not. This Comment will discuss how the Alaska Supreme Court utilized
established principles of logic to support this distinction and how it applied
these principles in fashioning its decision.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience.”1 In Alaska, however, Justice Holmes’
observation has not always been on the mark. The Alaska Supreme
Court’s decision in Carpenter v. Westwood One2 is a striking example.
The Carpenter case is important in several respects. Chief among
them is the court’s distinction between speech assertions that give rise to
defamation claims—assertions that are either true or false—and
communicative speech that gives rise to claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED)—speech that does not make assertions that
are true or false.3 This Comment will focus on the court’s distinction

1. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (A.B.A. 2009) (1881).
2. 171 P.3d 41 (Alaska 2007). This case appears in the Pacific Reporter as
“State v. Carpenter” and will be referred to throughout this Comment as
“Carpenter v. Westwood One.”
3. The Carpenter case also discusses the constitutionality of Section
09.17.020(j) of the Alaska Statutes, which requires fifty percent of a punitive
damage award to go to the State. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 67–68. The case is
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between defamatory speech and communicative speech that gives rise to
IIED claims, the logical principles on which the distinction rests, and
how the distinction led the court to its conclusion that communicative
speech that is neither true nor false is not speech that is protected by the
First Amendment against an IIED claim.

I. RELEVANT FACTS OF CARPENTER V. WESTWOOD ONE
Tom Leykis hosted a four-hour national radio talk show, The Tom
Leykis Show.4 The program originated in California and was produced
and distributed as a live radio show by Westwood One.5 Between June 8
and July 24, 1998, Juneau AM radio station KJNO broadcast the show
weekdays from two o’clock to six o’clock in the afternoon.6
The Tom Leykis Show commonly featured sex-related topics.7 Karen
Carpenter, a Juneau resident, first heard the show on July 20, 1998; its
content concerned her.8 Carpenter expressed her concerns to a member
of the City and Borough of Juneau Assembly, as well as to some of
KJNO’s advertisers who ran ads during Leykis’s show.9 She also faxed a
letter to KJNO stating that she found most of Leykis’s show “very
offensive” and unsuitable for children who might be listening.10
Carpenter wrote that she would “do everything in [her] power to have
the show taken off the air as soon as possible.”11 Someone at KJNO faxed
a copy of Carpenter’s letter, which showed her fax number, to The Tom
Leykis Show in California.12
At about this same time, KJNO’s station manager, Steve Rhyner,
decided to take The Tom Leykis Show off the air because of complaints
from advertisers.13 The program aired its final broadcast in Juneau on
July 24, 1998.14

noteworthy as well for its insightful examination of the tort of spoliation. See id.
at 64–67.
4. Id. at 47.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Examples of sexually themed topics discussed on the Tom Leykis Show
include: bestiality, group sex, incest, and sex toys. Brief of Appellant Karen
Carpenter at 5, Carpenter v. Westwood One, 171 P.3d 41 (Alaska 2007) (S-10700,
S-10709, S-10739), 2003 WL 25319456.
8. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 48.
9. Id.
10. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.

MCGEE_FINAL.DOC

52

5/7/2010 5:34:54 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 27:1

Leykis made a number of comments about KJNO’s cancellation of
his show, Carpenter’s letter, and Karen Carpenter during his July 24
broadcast.15 He described people who objected to his show as a “band of
old prunes and old blue-hairs, nut cases and . . . cretins.”16 He
complained “I hate those—those old biddies who sit out there and have
nothing better to do than to write in to radio stations,”17 and said that,
“Maybe if this woman had gotten laid in the last fifty years, who writes
into the station and started making all these waves, maybe she wouldn’t
be complaining so much. I’m not kidding.”18 Leykis read Carpenter’s
letter on the air and commented:
And it’s signed, the woman who wrote the letter—it’s signed:
Karen Carpenter. Well Karen, I have a little something that you
could use right now. [Buzzing sound intended to simulate the
sound of a vibrator.]
Sit on this, you old prune. Come on, get close to the radio. Get
right on top of the speaker, baby. You moron. You jerk. You
and your little band of nut cases out there, trying to decide
what’s going to be on the radio in Juneau, Alaska. You know,
maybe you ought to go out and get laid once in a while, huh?
[Buzzing sound.]
You cretin. Are your nipples getting hard yet, baby? Feel the
power. You can’t stop this show. Oh, you can stop Juneau,
Alaska. But you can’t stop me. . . .
You and your stupid—your stupid church and your stupid
religion, and you and your stupid god damned bunch of
marauders. You morons. Jerks.
I’m enjoying this. I’m sporting wood right now, just thinking
about it. . . .
Oh, Karen Carpenter. Karen Carpenter wanted our show off
the air. No, not that Karen Carpenter. But Karen, sit on it, baby.
[Buzzing sound.]
Oh, yeah. See, if you got more of this, you wouldn’t be writing
complaint letters to the station.19
Later in the show, a Juneau caller attempted to broadcast
Carpenter’s home telephone and fax numbers, which were listed in the
local telephone directory under “K.L. Carpenter.”20 The caller expressed

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 49.
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the hope that people would “send [Carpenter] faxes.”21 Carpenter’s
telephone number was partially bleeped out.22 Around this time Leykis
also encouraged his listeners to make Carpenter’s telephone “ring off the
hook.”23 Later, a Juneau fan called Leykis to praise his show.24 Leykis
responded: “Well, we hate to lose you, but like I say, stay tuned, ‘cause
we’re going to get back on in Juneau. . . . And we’re going to make that
woman’s life a living hell.”25 According to trial testimony, this “living
hell” comment was used repeatedly throughout the broadcast.”26
Carpenter herself heard the first part of Leykis’s broadcast and
learned of other parts from friends.27 She testified “that she felt
humiliated and sexually violated.”28 She also testified that she received a
telephone message “that repeated part of what Leykis had said about
her” and that she “received several threatening faxes at her home.”29
Sometime later, Carpenter was “diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
syndrome and an anxiety disorder.”30

II. LITIGATION HISTORY OF CARPENTER V. WESTWOOD ONE
Karen Carpenter filed suit in a Juneau superior court against Tom
Leykis, Westwood One, KJNO, Alaska Broadcast Communications, Inc.,
and Steve Rhyner.31 Carpenter alleged in her complaint that “Leykis’s
comments about her during his July 24, 1998 broadcast were
defamatory, caused negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and placed her in a false light.”32 She also alleged that Leykis
and Westwood One spoliated evidence.33
Three of the defendants—Leykis, Westwood One and Alaska
Broadcast Communications—“filed summary judgment motions on all
of Carpenter’s claims on the grounds that Leykis’s comments were

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 48–49.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 49.
33. Id. Carpenter’s “false light” claim rests on her right to privacy,
specifically the intrusion of her seclusion. See WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 117, 807, 812 (4th ed. 1971).
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protected by the First Amendment and that Carpenter was a limited
public figure on the issue of obscenity in mass media.”34
Carpenter also filed a summary judgment motion “on her claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy by way of false light publicity
and intrusion upon seclusion, and spoliation of evidence.”35
The trial court dismissed Carpenter’s claims based on “defamation,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and false light invasion of
privacy.”36 The superior court, however, refused to “grant summary
judgment to either side on Carpenter’s claims of IIED, intrusion upon
seclusion and intentional spoliation of evidence.”37
A trial was held on Carpenter’s remaining claims. A jury “found
that Westwood One had engaged in intentional spoliation of evidence
and awarded Carpenter $5042 in compensatory damages and $150,000
in punitive damages.”38 The jury also “returned a verdict for Leykis and
Westwood One on Carpenter’s claims of IIED and intrusion on
seclusion,” and returned a verdict “for Leykis on [the] spoliation
claim.”39
In a post-trial motion, Carpenter challenged the constitutionality of
Section 09.17.020(j) of the Alaska Statutes, which required fifty percent
of a punitive damage award to be paid over to the State.40 The trial court
held that the statute was constitutional.41

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Karen Carpenter’s two primary issues on appeal concerned: (1) the
trial court’s dismissal of her defamation and false light privacy claims;
and (2) the validity of one of the jury instructions that related to her IIED
claim.42 Carpenter also appealed two evidentiary rulings, as well as the
trial court’s ruling on Section 09.17.020(j) of the Alaska Statutes.43
Westwood One challenged the validity of the jury’s decision on
Carpenter’s spoliation claim and the constitutionality of the jury’s
punitive damages award.44
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 49–50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This Comment will focus on the Alaska Supreme Court’s reasoning
and ultimate rulings on: (1) Carpenter’s appeal of the trial court’s
dismissal of her defamation and false light claims; and (2) Carpenter’s
appeal regarding the validity of the jury instruction related to her IIED
claim.45

IV. THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT’S RULING ON CARPENTER’S
DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT ISSUES
A.

Carpenter’s Defamation Claim

The superior court dismissed Carpenter’s defamation claim,
reasoning that “Leykis’s statements about Ms. Carpenter . . . [were]
opinionated insults protected by the First Amendment.”46 The trial court
held that Leykis’s statements were “hyperbole, used only for shock
value, and d[id] not state or imply any factual basis.”47
In her appeal, Carpenter argued that the fact-opinion distinction
drawn by the United States Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co.48 and Sands v. Living Word Fellowship49 was not relevant to her case
because Leykis’s speech fell into three categories that are not protected
by the First Amendment: (1) “indecent speech” under the Supreme
Court’s ruling in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation;50 (2) “obscenity” under the
three-pronged test set out in Miller v. California;51 and (3) “fighting
words” under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.52
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected all three of Carpenter’s
arguments. The court concluded that Leykis’s statements were
45. Carpenter’s appeal of evidentiary matters and her appeal of the trial
court’s ruling on the constitutionality of Section 09.17.020(j) of the Alaska
Statutes will not be discussed here. Westwood One’s issues on appeal also will
not be considered in this Comment.
46. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. 497 U.S. 1 (1990). In Milkovich, the Court held that expressions of opinion
on matters of public concern that are alleged to be defamatory are protected by
the First Amendment from a defamation action. See id. at 20. If the “opinion
reasonably implies false and defamatory facts about a public figure or official,”
the plaintiff “must show such statements were made with knowledge of their
false implications or with reckless disregard of their truth.”Id. But if “such a
statement involves a private figure on a matter of public concern, a plaintiff
must show that the false connotations were made with some level of fault.” Id.
49. 34 P.3d 955 (Alaska 2001). Sands held that statements that “are not factual
statements capable of being proven true or false . . . are not actionable as a basis
in a defamation claim.” Id. at 960.
50. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
51. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
52. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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“opinionated insults” and “hyperbole, used only for shock value,” and
that the statements did not “imply any factual basis.”53 The court
concluded that Leykis’s speech was protected under Milkovich and
Sands.54
B.

Carpenter’s False Light Invasion of Privacy Claim

The Alaska Supreme Court, relying on Time, Inc. v. Hill,55 held that
Carpenter’s false light claim failed for the same reason that her
defamation claim failed:
A false light invasion of privacy claim arises when the
defendant publicizes a matter that places the plaintiff before
the public in a false light. In many cases, the publicity is
defamatory, although a plaintiff need not show injury to
reputation to prevail on a false light claim. An action for false
light invasion of privacy differs from an action for defamation
because a defamation claim redresses damage to reputation
while a false light privacy claim redresses mental distress from
exposure to public view. Like defamation liability, however,
false light liability requires at least knowing or reckless
disregard of the falsity of the assertion of fact. Because opinions
cannot be proved false, they cannot give rise to false light
liability. Carpenter’s false light invasion of privacy claim relies
on the same statements that formed the basis for her
defamation claim. It therefore fails.56

V. THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT’S RULING ON CARPENTER’S
IIED JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUE
A.

Carpenter’s Argument

The issue that Carpenter raised about jury instructions concerns the
logical interplay among two jury instructions (“Jury Instruction Nos. 17
and 18”), one Special Interrogatory (“Special Interrogatory 1”), and the
answer given to part of a Special Verdict Form (“Special Verdict Form”).
Instruction No. 18 read as follows:
Karen Carpenter claims that Tom Leykis or Westwood One or
its employees or agents intentionally inflicted emotional

53.
54.
55.
56.

Carpenter v. Westwood One, 171 P.3d 41, 51 (Alaska 2007).
Id.
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 53 (citations omitted).
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distress on her by virtue of a radio broadcast on July 24, 1998.
For Karen Carpenter to recover for this claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, you must decide that it is more
likely true than not true that Tom Leykis’s or Westwood One or
its employee’s conduct was extreme and outrageous and that
he/they intentionally or recklessly caused Karen Carpenter
severe emotional distress.57
Instruction No. 17 was also given to the jury, and the instruction
read in relevant part:
The law protects most speech. By example, statements of
opinion, even if insulting or distasteful are generally protected
speech. It is only in limited circumstances that speech can be
punished or be the basis of liability for damages. Therefore,
you shall not consider words spoken to or about Karen
Carpenter unless you find that the speech is not protected
because of either of the following reasons: (1) Speech that is
intended to provoke a hostile reaction under circumstances
where a clear and present danger of immediate violence exists
is not protected speech. . . .58
Special Interrogatory 1 read as follows: “Did Tom Leykis engage in
speech related to Karen Carpenter that was intended to provoke a
hostile reaction under circumstances where a clear and present danger
of immediate violence existed?”59
The Special Verdict Form, in relevant part, asked whether the jury
found by clear and convincing evidence that “the conduct of Tom Leykis
and/or Westwood One (or its employees or agents) was outrageous and
thus subject to an award of punitive damages[.]”60
Carpenter did not challenge Instruction No. 18. Rather, her
challenge related to the logical relationship between Instruction No. 17
and Special Interrogatory 1, and the jury’s answer to the Special Verdict
Form. Carpenter did not argue that Instruction No. 17 was incorrect
because it told the jury that it “could not consider as a basis for liability
words spoken to or about Carpenter unless the speech was unprotected .
. . .”61 This is a truism. Rather, Carpenter argued that Instruction No. 17

57. Id. at 54–55.
58. Id. at 54. Instruction No. 17 also defined a second class of unprotected
speech for the purpose of an IIED action as speech that involved the
“[p]ublication of private factual information. . . .” Id. Carpenter did not rely on
this second class of unprotected speech in her argument on appeal.
59. Id. at 55.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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took a wrong turn when it defined “unprotected speech” for purposes of
an IIED claim as “speech that is intended to provoke a hostile reaction
under circumstances where a clear and present danger of immediate
violence exists.”62
Carpenter made two arguments. First, she argued that she was not
a “public figure,” and that therefore the holding in Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell63 was not relevant to her IIED claim.64 Second, she argued that,
even if she were a public figure (or a limited public figure), Instruction
No. 17’s restriction of a viable IIED claim to “speech that is intended to
provoke a hostile reaction under circumstances where a clear and
present danger of immediate violence exists” was not consistent with
the rule in Falwell65 and had no relevance whatsoever in Carpenter’s
case, since her IIED claim was based on specific words uttered by
Leykis.66
With the premise that Instruction No. 17 was erroneous, Carpenter
argued that the error was prejudicial, given that: (1) the jury answered
“Yes” to the Special Verdict Form with regard to the question whether it
found by clear and convincing evidence that “the conduct of Tom Leykis
. . . was outrageous”;67 and (2) that the jury answered “No” to Special
Interrogatory 1 with regard to whether “Tom Leykis engage[d] in
speech related to Karen Carpenter that was intended to provoke a
hostile reaction under circumstances where a clear and present danger
of immediate violence existed[.]”68
In other words, by instructing the jury that it could not consider
Leykis’s speech in evaluating Carpenter’s IIED claim unless “a clear and
present danger of immediate violence existed,”69 the jury, after finding
that Leykis’s speech was not “intended to provoke a hostile reaction
under circumstances where a clear and present danger of immediate

62. Id.
63. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
64. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 56.
65. The court in Falwell held that “[P]ublic figures and public officials may
not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of
publications . . . without showing in addition that the publication contains a
false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it
was true.” See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56.
66. See Brief of Appellant Karen Carpenter, supra note 7, at 37–47
67. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 55.
68. Id.; see also Brief of Appellant Karen Carpenter, supra note 7, at 48–52.
69. See Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 53.
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violence existed,”70 could not logically find for Carpenter on her IIED
claim even though it found that Leykis’s conduct was “outrageous.”71
B.

The Alaska Supreme Court’s Analysis of Carpenter’s Argument
1.

The Court’s Distinction Between Leykis’s Speech that Gave Rise to
Carpenter’s Defamation Claim and the Speech that Gave Rise to
Carpenter’s IIED Claim
The court began its analysis by noting that “an IIED claim that
turns on the truth or falsity of speech is subject to the same limitations
that protect speech from claims of defamation.”72 Since malice and
falsity must be proved by a public figure who claims defamation, a
public figure who claims IIED based on the same language that gave rise
to his defamation claim must also prove malice and falsity. The court
also assumed that if a plaintiff (public figure or not) claims defamation
rising out of speech on a matter of public concern, malice also must be
proved by the plaintiff who claims IIED arising out of the same speech.73
Carpenter argued that she was not a public figure and that the
speech that gave rise to her IIED claim was not on a matter of public
concern. In response, the court stated that the question of whether
Carpenter was a public figure was irrelevant.74 The court found that the
question of whether Carpenter was a public figure “would be important
to her IIED claim if that claim, like her defamation claim, turned on the
truth or falsity of Leykis’s words about Carpenter.”75 In other words, if
Carpenter’s IIED claim was based on the same speech that gave rise to
her defamation claim, she would have to prove the falsity of the speech,
and, if she were a public figure or a limited public figure, she would also
have to “prove actual malice to prevail on her IIED claim.”76
Here, the court made a critical distinction: Carpenter’s IIED claim
was “not based on the truth or falsity of Leykis’s words . . . .”77 From this
distinction, the court concluded that it did “not need to decide whether
Carpenter was a public figure” and “that the heightened protections due
speech about public figures and matters of public concern [did] not
altogether foreclose Carpenter’s IIED claims.”78
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 55.
73. Id. (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–53, 55–56
(1988)).
74. Id. at 56.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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If Carpenter’s IIED claim was not based on Leykis’s speech (or
assertions) that were either true or false, then what was her claim based
on? The court’s answer was that her claim was based on “speech
intended merely to harass or cause others to harass the target.”79
Specifically, Carpenter’s IIED claim was based on Leykis’s speech telling
his listeners to “harass” her and “make her life a living hell.”80 Leykis’s
speech in this narrow regard did not consist of assertions of fact that
could be proved true or false, but rather consisted of commands to his
listeners. Thus, the court concluded that, “[u]nlike her defamation claim,
Carpenter’s IIED claim was not dependent on the truth or falsity of
Leykis’s words.”81 Consequently, to prevail on her IIED claim,
Carpenter did not have to prove Leykis’s speech was false or that it was
uttered with malice.
As for the holding in Falwell, the court denied that it stands “for the
proposition that every IIED claim based on an utterance invariably
requires proof of a falsehood.”82
2. The Logical Basis for the Court’s Distinction
Logic is said to be “the study of the methods and principles used to
distinguish good (correct) from bad (incorrect) reasoning.”83 Since
reasoning is expressed in sentences, logicians draw a clear distinction
between sentences that make (or imply) some assertion of fact and those
that do not. The former are said to assert propositions; while the latter
do not. Propositions, then, “are either true or false, and in this they differ
from questions, commands, exclamations. . . . Only propositions can be
either asserted or denied; questions may be asked and commands given
and exclamations uttered, but none of them can be affirmed, denied, or
judged to be either true or false.”84
A sentence, however, is not a proposition. The following two
sentences, while different, express (or assert) the same proposition:
“Sarah Palin was the republican candidate for Vice-President of
the United States.”
“The republican candidate for Vice-President of the United
States was Sarah Palin.”

79. Id. at 57.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 56 n.44. Later in its opinion, the court found that there was no
special protection for “harassing speech” in federal law. See id. at 59–61.
83. IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 2 (9th ed. 1994).
84. Id. at 4.
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Similarly, a sentence is always in a particular language. And while
the expression, “it is snowing” can be expressed in many types of
sentence formulations in any number of different languages, all the
sentences have a single meaning; that is, they express the same
proposition.85 A proposition, then, is “[a] statement; what is typically
asserted using a declarative sentence, and hence always true or false—
although its truth or falsity may be unknown.”86
If we apply this terminology to the Carpenter decision, the court
found that Carpenter’s IIED claim was not based on any proposition
uttered by Leykis. Rather, it was based on commands uttered by Leykis
that cannot be “judged to be either true or false.” Since the essence of
Carpenter’s claim was that Leykis’s “commands” were “outrageous”
and caused her emotional distress, her IIED claim was not foreclosed by
Falwell. This conclusion follows from the court’s understanding that the
holding of Falwell is concerned only with propositional speech that is
“about a public figure” or propositional speech that is “about a matter of
public concern.”87
C.

The Court’s Analysis of the Effect of Instruction No. 17 on the
Jury

The Alaska Supreme Court and all parties agreed that Instruction
No. 18 was proper.88 As for Instruction No. 17, the court found that,
given its breadth, the jury likely applied the instruction to Carpenter’s
IIED claim.89 Instruction No. 17 told the jury:
It is only in limited circumstances that speech can be punished
or be the basis of liability for damages. Therefore, you shall not
consider words spoken to or about Karen Carpenter unless you
find that the speech is not protected. . . . Speech that is intended
to produce a hostile reaction under circumstances where a clear
and present danger of immediate violence exists, is not
protected speech.90
Before the jury could consider the merits of Carpenter’s IIED claim,
they first had to be convinced that Carpenter proved Leykis’s speech
was “intended to provoke a hostile reaction under circumstances where
a clear and present danger of immediate violence exists . . . .” Since the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 710.
Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 56 (emphasis added).
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 54.
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jury, in its answer to Special Interrogatory 1, found that Leykis did not
“engage in speech . . . intended to provoke a hostile reaction . . . ,” it
could not consider the merits of Carpenter’s IIED claim.91
The court had a problem with Instruction No. 17 because, as a
matter of law, Carpenter did not need to prove the element of a “hostile
reaction . . . where a clear and present danger of immediate violence
exists . . .” in order to prevail on her IIED claim.92 The speech that
formed the basis of Carpenter’s IIED claim was not protected (because it
was non-propositional speech); thus, it could “be found to be
outrageous if a jury finds that the speaker intended to harass by
provoking a widespread audience to react with hostility toward the
target of humiliating and demeaning comments”:93
There is no reason why an IIED plaintiff under such
circumstances must prove that there is in fact a clear and
present danger of immediate violence; so long as Leykis acted
with the requisite intent to harass, it is enough that a
reasonable person could think that his comments were likely to
prompt listeners to contact or communicate with Carpenter in a
hostile fashion, thus accomplishing his objective. In short, the
“hostile reaction” exception did not accurately describe
Carpenter’s IIED claim, and made it more difficult for her to
prevail on that claim.94
The court also found that there was “no basis for thinking the
verdict would have been the same if it had been clear to the jury that
Carpenter’s IIED claim only had to satisfy Instruction No. 18 and did not
also have to satisfy Instruction No. 17 . . . .”95 After all, in answering the
Special Verdict form, “the jury found by clear and convincing evidence
that Leykis’s conduct was outrageous and thus subject to an award of
punitive damages.”96
The court came to its ultimate conclusion on the basis of the above
reasoning:
We therefore hold that Instruction No. 17 potentially prevented
the jury from giving fair consideration to Carpenter’s IIED
claim. Remand for a new trial is necessary. The jury on remand

91. Id. at 55.
92. Id. at 61.
93. Id. at 62. The court also found that the “instruction’s exception for
publication of private factual information was equally inapplicable, and equally
potentially prejudicial.” See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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should consider whether Leykis’s conduct, when viewed in its
entirety: (1) was extreme and outrageous, (2) was intentional or
reckless, and (3) caused [Carpenter] severe emotional distress.97

VI. THE COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS ON REMAND
In crafting its instructions on remand, the Alaska Supreme Court
faced the question of the relevance of Leykis’s “derogatory comments”
to Carpenter’s IIED claim. The court stressed that Leykis’s derogatory
comments about Carpenter, comments that asserted propositions, could
not be “the sole basis for her IIED claim,” in part because they were
“entitled to some speech protections.”98 Leykis’s derogatory comments
“attacked the wisdom and need for cancellation by attacking [Carpenter]
and her values.”99 And, since his comments “addressed a matter of
public interest, under Alaska law, they are qualifiedly privileged.”100
Additionally, because Leykis’s words were “arguably germane to the
show’s cancellation, a topic of public interest, they [could not] be
considered outrageous conduct.”101
Nonetheless, though Leykis’s derogatory comments could not be
considered as a basis for Carpenter’s IIED claim, they “remain[ed]
potentially relevant” to this claim:102
[T]he jury on remand may consider how Leykis’s derogatory
comments bore on whether it was extreme and outrageous to
encourage listeners to contact Carpenter or harass her. It might
think his comments were intended to incite listeners to contact
Carpenter or harass her. It might think his comments were
intended to incite listeners to act on his arguable invitation to
take harassing action against her and increased the
foreseeability and likelihood that some would do so. In this, the
comments bear on whether Leykis acted with the mental state
required for an IIED claim. Finally, the words may also be
relevant to the question whether Carpenter suffered severe
emotional distress.103

97. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 63.
102. Id. In other words, the jury may well find that Leykis’s derogatory
comments created a context that warranted the conclusion that it was “extreme
and outrageous” for Leykis to encourage his listeners to harass Carpenter.
103. Id.
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VII. JUSTICE CARPENETI’S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Carpeneti would have resolved the Instruction No. 17 issue
on whether Carpenter was a “public figure.” The test for answering the
public figure question, he said, is the four-prong query that was set out
in Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co.:104
A defendant must show the plaintiff has: (1) successfully
invited public attention to his views in an effort to influence
others prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2)
voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy related to
the subject of litigation; (3) assumed a position of prominence
in the public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and
continuing access to the media.105
Justice Carpeneti concluded that Carpenter did not meet the test’s
first, third and fourth elements:
On these facts, I would conclude that Carpenter did not
“invite[] public attention” to her views. I also conclude that the
evidence did not establish that Carpenter “assumed a position
of prominence” through her participation in the
controversy. . . . Finally, there is no evidence that Carpenter
had or exercised any access to the media, much less “regular
and continuing access.” The fact that Leykis read Carpenter’s
letter on the air during the July 24 broadcast does not change
my conclusion, because “those charged with defamation
cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by
making the claimant a public figure.”106
Since “the [S]tate’s interest in protecting private individuals from
the intentional infliction of emotional distress outweighs the First
Amendment interest in speech on private matters concerning private
individuals,” Justice Carpeneti concluded that Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell should not be extended “to IIED claims brought by private
individuals such as Carpenter”:107
The state has a “strong and legitimate” interest in protecting
private individuals from unprovoked verbal attacks. Private
figures like Carpenter are both less equipped to defend

104. 745 F.2d 123 (2d. Cir. 1984).
105. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 71 (Carpeneti, J., concurring) (citing Lerman, 745
F.2d at 136–37).
106. Id. at 73 (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979))
(citations omitted).
107. Id. at 74.
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themselves against attack and more worthy of protection than
are public figures who run the risk of closer public scrutiny, but
“enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication.” Although Carpenter voluntarily participated
in the controversy over the show’s cancellation, the limited and
discrete nature of her participation did not warrant the degree
of exposure she received. Application of defamation standards
to the IIED claims of private figures exposes to retaliation any
private individual exercising her own free speech rights to
complain about media program content. In such circumstances,
no one could ever safely complain about the media without
risking public attack. It would chill listeners’ desires to voice
their opinions. This result is inconsistent with the value placed
on listener input by the FCC regulations as well as the values
represented by the First Amendment.108

VIII. JUSTICE FABE’S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Fabe raised two principal objections in her dissent. First, she
argued that Leykis’s “call to arms,” which the majority said invited
listeners “to harass Carpenter,” was nothing more “than the sort of
hyperbole and rhetoric that is typical of debate about public figures and
matters of public concern in this day and age.”109 The only thing Leykis
encouraged his listeners to do “was to persuade Carpenter, a public
figure, to change her mind by demonstrating that she held the minority
view and by suggesting alternate routes to address her concerns.”110
The dissent’s second objection concerned the majority’s holding
that Carpenter’s IIED claim was “not based on any statement of fact,
false or otherwise.”111 This holding, the dissent argued, was “wholly
inconsistent” with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell.112
Falwell, the dissent argued, cannot be read as limiting its
constitutional protections to only those statements that are true or false:
Falwell is clearly intended to protect opinion statements about
public figures and matters of public concern. And the very
definition of an opinion is that its accuracy cannot be
established. By attempting to distinguish this case on the
grounds that Leykis’s statement can be neither true nor false,
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 75 (Fabe, J., dissenting).
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id.
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the court exposes all opinion statements directed at public
figures to IIED liability. This is not only clearly contrary to
Falwell but substantially eviscerates the protections it
extended.113
The dissent appears to equate a statement whose “accuracy cannot
be determined” with a statement that “can be neither true nor false.”
And so the strength of the dissent’s second objection rests on the
premise that “opinions” cannot be true or false. So, if no opinion can be
true or false (i.e., “its accuracy cannot be determined”), then the dissent
is quite correct that the majority “exposes all opinion statements
directed at public figures to IIED liability.”
The truth of the premise “that no opinion can be true or false” is
doubtful. The Supreme Court stated in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
that “expressions of opinions may often imply an assertion of objective
fact”:
If a speaker says, “In my opinion John Jones is a liar,” he
implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that
Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon
which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or
incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the
statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply
couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel
these implications; and the statement, “In my opinion Jones is a
liar,” can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement,
“Jones is a liar.”114
Opinions, then, can be true or false. If I say, “I think that going to
war in Iraq was not in the best interests of the United States,” I am really
saying two things: (1) that going to war in Iraq was not in the best
interests of the United States; and (2) that I believe that going to war in
Iraq was not in the best interests of the United States. In essence, I am
asserting two propositions, both of which may be true or false.115
Since opinions can be true or false, the dissent’s argument that the
majority misread Falwell and exposed “all opinion statements directed at
public figures to IIED liability” loses much of its force.

113. Id. at 78.
114. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1990).
115. See id. at 20 n.7 (“For instance, the statement ‘I think Jones lied’ may be
provable as false on two levels. First, that the speaker really did not think Jones
had lied but said it anyway, and second that Jones really had not lied. It is of
course the second level of falsity which would ordinarily serve as the basis for a
defamation action, though falsity at the first level may serve to establish malice
when that is required for recovery.”).

MCGEE_FINAL.DOC

2010

5/7/2010 5:34:54 PM

CARPENTER V. WESTWOOD ONE

67

IX. IIED CLAIMS IN ALASKA AFTER CARPENTER
An IIED claim can be based on conduct or, as in Carpenter, based on
speech. If a plaintiff is a public figure (or limited public figure) and her
IIED claim is based on speech that makes assertions that have a truth
value (that is, propositions that are either true or false), then, under
Falwell, the plaintiff must prove that the assertions are false and that they
were made with malice. Carpenter is clear on this.116
Carpenter is also clear that a plaintiff must, if her IIED claim is based
on speech that makes assertions about a matter of public concern, prove
“actual malice” in addition to the falsity of the speech.117 But if a
plaintiff, regardless of whether she is a public figure, bases her claim on
non-assertive speech that “relates to a matter of public interest,” the
speech “loses its protection and can give rise to an IIED claim if, in
addition to meeting the other requirements for an IIED claim, it is
uttered with an intent merely to harass and with no intent to persuade,
inform, or communicate.” 118
Finally, if a plaintiff is not a public figure and her IIED claim is
based on speech that is not about a matter of public concern, but which
nonetheless makes assertions that are either true or false, it is an open
question whether she must meet the requirements of Falwell, or whether
she only has to prove the common law elements of an IIED tort. Based
on Justice Carpeneti’s reasoning in his concurring opinion, a strong case
can be made that a plaintiff must only prove the elements of an IIED
tort.
To summarize, the essential holding of Carpenter is this: if a
plaintiff, whether or not she is a public figure, bases an IIED claim on
speech that makes no assertions and expresses no propositions, then she
need only prove the common law elements of the tort of IIED.

CONCLUSION
Justice Fabe was correct when she argued that the purpose of the
“freedom of speech” clause in the First Amendment is to protect debate
and discussion of public issues: “The purpose of protecting speech is to

116. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 55.
117. Id. Under federal law, if a plaintiff in this circumstance is “a private
figure,” Milkovich says that she need only “show that the false connotations were
made with some level of fault.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
118. Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 59. The majority assumes, quite reasonably, that
this kind of unprotected speech does not make assertions that are either true or
false. See id. at 55.
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avoid unnecessarily chilling public debate and dialogue.”119 Thus, a
serious objection to the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in the
Carpenter case is that it will chill debate about matters of public concern
and inhibit “robust political dialogue.”120
In considering the merits of the objection, it is helpful to remember
that the matter of public concern in Carpenter was whether, given the
typical content of The Tom Leykis Show, it was appropriate for the show
to be broadcast in Juneau, Alaska. This was the political issue raised by
Karen Carpenter.
If the majority decision had been based on the dissent’s reasoning,
the practical effect would have been to inhibit an ordinary person like
Karen Carpenter from exercising her right to speak freely. As the
subjects and themes of national talk radio become increasingly
controversial, an individual who objects to the content of a particular
show will be reluctant to voice her concern. And she may even be
inhibited to the extent that she foregoes such ordinary expressions of
opinion as writing a letter to the editor or to the local radio station. After
all, she would run the risk of having a national talk show host, a person
who has the power to directly communicate to millions of devoted
listeners, make “crass, mean and utterly repugnant”121 remarks about
her over the air, humiliate her, and then, using “outrageous”122
language, encourage his listeners to contact her “in a hostile fashion.”123
The Carpenter case presents a First Amendment dilemma. No
matter how it was decided, either Tom Leykis’s or Karen Carpenter’s
speech would have been “chilled” in some way. But there is a great
difference here. Though he lost, Leykis can still voice his opinion that his
show should remain on the air, and he can still encourage his listeners to
support his efforts to stay on the air. If, however, the decision had gone
the other way, this is not true for individuals like Karen Carpenter. Their
speech objecting to shows like Leykis’s would be severely inhibited.
Plato posed a question more than 2300 years ago: can Justice be
defined as “the interest of the stronger”?124 Had the Alaska Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Leykis, justice would indeed have been
understood as the interest of the stronger. Leykis, with all of the power
of his microphone and his legions of loyal listeners, would have, in
effect, been granted the power to stifle the free speech of those with very
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
1982).

Id. at 80 (Fabe, J., dissenting).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 19 (Benjamin Jowett trans., The Modern Library
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little status and very little power. But justice cannot be understood as the
interest of the stronger; the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in
Carpenter reinforces this truth.

